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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of fertility and official pension age on long-run pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pensions based on an overlapping generations model. We find that increasing the fertility rate 
or official pension age does not necessarily raise pensions.  When the output elasticity of capital is low, 
an increase in the fertility rate or official pension age may raise pensions, but such a change reduces 
pensions if the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate are high. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century, many developed countries have witnessed steady declines in their fertility rate 
and mortality rate, leading to concerns about the sustainability of social security systems, particularly 
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. There is a huge amount of literature devoted to possible 
solutions to the problem of the increasing pension burden caused by aging populations. One possible 
solution is to reform the pension system from unfunded schemes to funded schemes. Since such a 
reform would cause a dramatic effect on individuals during the transition,1 the provision for child 
allowances and the postponement of the official pension age have become popular governmental 
policies in recent decades, with the common belief that raising the fertility rate or delaying the official 
pension age would lead to a situation where more workers support fewer old people, thus reducing the 
burden placed upon government budgets. Providing child allowances reduces the cost of raising 
children, and parents may then have stronger incentives to have more children. This policy can be found 
in many developed countries such as Australia, Ireland, Japan and Sweden. By postponing the official 
pension age, workers work longer and benefit from pensions for a shorter length of time. In Australia, 
men and women currently aged 65 are eligible for the age pension. The Australian government 
announced in 2009 that the Age Pension age will start increasing from 2017 and reach 76 years of age 
by 2023.  
While most people believe that raising the fertility rate and official pension age can increase 
pensions, Cigno (2007) has a different opinion: “The combined effect of fewer births, longer lives and 
sluggish retirement age is putting public pension system, all essentially pay-as-you-go, under 
increasing strain.” This calls for a need to analytically examine the effect of fertility and official 
pension age on pensions. Although policies of increasing the fertility rate and official pension age are 
usually implemented together in developed countries, previous studies tend to examine their effects 
separately. For example, Fanti and Gori (2012) study the effect of fertility on pensions based on a model 
without the consideration of official pension age. Miyazaki (2014) analyzes the influence of official 
pension age on pensions by assuming that the population is constant. These two studies find that 
increasing the fertility rate or official pension age does not necessarily raise pensions.  
This paper studies how fertility and the official pension age impact long-run pension benefits based 
on an overlapping generations model that incorporates both the fertility rate and official pension age. 
Since our focus is the influence of fertility and official pension age on pensions, we follow Fanti 
and Gori (2012) and Miyazaki (2014) and assume that the fertility rate and official pension age are 
exogenously given. Adults need to work in order to consume and to raise children. Old agents need to 
work for a fraction of time in old age. After they retire, they enjoy pension benefits. Government 
                                                 
1  See Zhang and Zhang (2003) for a comparison of unfunded and funded social security systems. 
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implements the PAYG social security system. All workers need to pay income tax to support the 
pensions.  
We find that increasing the fertility rate or official pension age does not necessarily raise pensions.  
Such a change in fertility or official pension age causes a positive direct effect due to more labor 
contributing to pensions and a negative effect due to decreases in the equilibrium wage and savings. We 
show that the output elasticity of capital plays an important role in determining the effects of fertility and 
official pension age on pension benefits since it governs the general equilibrium feedback of the wage 
rate. When the output elasticity of capital is low, an increase in the fertility rate or official pension age 
may raise pensions, but such a change reduces pensions if the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate 
are high. Our results also indicate that raising fertility tends to reduce pensions for developing countries, 
while postponing the official pension age tends to increase pensions for developed countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 
analyzes the effects of fertility and the official pension age on long-run pension benefits. Section 4 
concludes. 
2.  THE MODEL 
We consider an overlapping generations model where agents live for three periods - childhood, 
adulthood (parenthood), and old age. Adults in period t care about their consumption in adulthood 
(ܿ௧) and in old age (ܿ௧ାଵ). The utility function, which is identical for all agents, is defined as:  
                                                               ݑ௧ ൌ lnܿ௧ ൅ ߚlnܿ௧ାଵ,					                                              (1) 
where ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the discount factor. 
All decisions are made in adulthood, with adults deciding how much to consume, and how 
much they should save for their old age (ݏ௧). In each period, agents are endowed with one unit of 
time. Adults with population ( ௧ܰ) spend all their time working to earn wages (ݓ௧). Following Fanti 
and Gori (2012), we assume that the number of children (n) is exogenous. It takes a fixed 
proportion (ݍ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ) of each adult’s wage to raise a child (see, e.g., Wigger 1999; Boldrin and 
Jones 2002; Fanti and Gori 2012). In order to pay for pensions for the elderly, the government 
levies an income tax with the rate ߬ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. The budget constraint for an adult is:     
																																																											ܿ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൅ ݊ݍݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ௧.																																																				ሺ2ሻ 
Following Miyazaki (2014), we assume that old agents are eligible for pensions at age ሺ1 ൅ 	݈ሻ 
as regulated by law. Since we do not distinguish between official pension age and retirement age, 
this implies that agents work at a fraction of time ݈ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ in their old age. The budget constraint 
for an old agent is:     
                                 ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈ݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ௧ܲାଵ,                              (3) 
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where ܴ௧ାଵ is the gross rate of return of savings, ௧ܲାଵ is the pensions per unit of time and ߠ ൐ 0 is 
the productivity of an old agent.2 
The government runs a balanced budget. Given that the tax revenue is used to provide 
pensions for the old, this implies that: 
                                          ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ௧ܰ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ ߬ݓ௧ାଵሺ ௧ܰାଵ ൅ ߠ݈ ௧ܰሻ.                               (4) 
Output is produced by using capital (Kt) and effective labor (ܮ௧ ൌ ௧ܰ ൅ ߠ݈ ௧ܰିଵ) and is based 
on the Cobb-Douglas production function ௧ܻ ൌ ܣܭ௧ఈܮ௧ଵିఈ , where ܣ ൐ 0		and		ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ  is the 
output elasticity of capital. We define ݇௧ ൌ ܭ௧/ܮ௧. The gross rate of the return on capital and the 
real wage rate are respectively: 
																																																																													ܴ௧ ൌ ߙܣ݇௧ఈିଵ,																																																													ሺ5ሻ	
																																																																											ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܣ݇௧ఈ.																																																							ሺ6ሻ 
2.1  Equilibrium and steady state 
The optimal decision of ݏ௧ is: 
																																				ݏ௧ ൌ ߚ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻݓ௧
1 ൅ ߚ െ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈ݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ௧ܲାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ߚሻܴ௧ାଵ .																									ሺ7ሻ 
Market clearing in the capital market indicates that ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ݇௧ ൌ ݏ௧ . Using (4)-(7), the law of 
motion of ݇௧ is: 
																																											݇௧ାଵ ൌ ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻܣߚ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ
ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ݇௧
ఈ.																									ሺ8ሻ 
Equation (8) implies that there exists a unique, globally stable steady state ݇∗: 
																																												݇∗ ൌ ቈ ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻܣߚሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ቉
ଵ
ଵିఈ .																											ሺ9ሻ 
To ensure ݇∗ ൐ 0, we assume that 1 െ ߬ ൏ ݍ݊. 
3.  PENSIONS 
Equation (4) indicates that: 
      ݌∗ ൌ ݌∗ሺ݊, ݈, ݇∗ሺ݊, ݈ሻሻ.                                               (10) 
From (10), we derive: 
                                                 
2  Sala-i-Martin (1996) argues that old workers are less productive than young workers due to the depreciation 
of human capital. 
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* *
dp p p w k
dx x w k x
   

   
   

,                                           (11) 
where ݔ ൌ ݊, ݈. Although a higher fertility rate (retirement age) means more labor (direct effect) 
contributing to pensions, the lower equilibrium wage rate reduces savings and capital accumulation, 
causing per efficiency unit of pensions to decrease (indirect effect). Fertility or retirement age and 
pensions are positively (negatively) correlated if the direct (indirect) effect dominates. 
Combining (4), (7) and (9), we can derive long-run PAYG pensions as: 
																	݌∗ ൌ ߬ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ1 െ ݈ ቊܣሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቈ
ߙߚሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ቉
ఈ
ቋ
ଵ
ଵିఈ
.							ሺ12ሻ 
Proposition 1.  (1) For ߙ ∈ ሺ0, ଵଶሿ, there exists a unique ݍ௡ ൐ 0 such that 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 if ݍ ൏ ݍ௡  and 
vice versa. (2) For ߙ ∈ ሺଵଶ , 1ሻ, there exists a unique ߬௡ such that if  ߬ ൏ ߬௡, then 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 if ݍ ൏ ݍ௡ and vice versa. If  ߬ ൐ ߬௡, then 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0. 
Proof:   From (12), we have: 
݀݌∗
݀݊ ൌ
߬ሾെݍߦଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦଶሿ
1 െ ݈ ቊ
ܣሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߙߚሿఈሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻଶఈିଵ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻቋ
ଵ
ଵିఈ, 
where  
 ߦଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ଶ[ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൅ ሺ݊ ൅ ߙߠ݈ሻሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠ݈ ൐ 0,  
 ߦଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻ݊[ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠ݈. 
Define ݍ௡ ൌ ሺଵିఛሻకమకభ . Note that ߦଶ ൐ 0 if ߙ ∈ ሺ0,
ଵ
ଶሿ	. Thus, 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 if ݍ ൏ ݍ௡ and vice versa. 
If ߙ ∈ ሺଵଶ , 1ሻ, then ߦଶ ൐ 0 if ߬ ൏ ߬௡ ൌ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵାఈఉሻఏ௟ିሺଶఈିଵሻ௡ఈሺଵାఉሻ
ሺଶఈିଵሻ௡ሺଵିఈሻ . This implies that 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 
if ݍ ൏ ݍ௡ and vice versa. If ߬ ൐ ߬௡, then ߦଶ ൏ 0, implying  ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0. 
QED.  
Recall that an increase in fertility produces two opposite effects on ݌∗ . When the output 
elasticity of capital is lower, an increase in fertility causes a smaller reduction in wages. Moreover, 
the lower cost of rearing children (ݍ) induces higher savings and capital accumulation, resulting in 
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a higher ݌∗. Proposition 1 shows that if ߙ ൑ ଵଶ, then an increase in fertility raises ݌∗ if ݍ ൏ ݍ௡ and 
vice versa.  
When ߙ ൐ ଵଶ, the result also depends on the tax rate. On the one hand, a higher tax rate directly 
increases contributions to ݌∗ . On the other hand, it reduces ݌∗  indirectly due to lower after-tax 
income and savings. We find that if the tax rate is sufficiently low such that ߬ ൏ ߬௡, then the effect 
of an increase in fertility on pensions is similar to the case of ߙ ൑ ଵଶ and that an increase in ݊ may 
increase or decrease ݌∗, depending on the value of ݍ. However, if the tax rate is sufficiently high 
such that ߬ ൐ ߬௡, then an increase in fertility reduces ݌∗, regardless of ݍ. Notice that డఛ೙డ௟ ൐ 0 and 
డఛ೙
డఏ ൐ 0. Since developing countries tend to have a higher ߙ and a lower ߬௡ (due to early retirement 
age and low productivity of old workers), then an increase in fertility is very likely to reduce ݌∗ in 
these countries. 
The following proposition concerns the effect of retirement age on pensions. 
Proposition 2.  There exists a unique ߙ௟ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ such that: (1) for ߙ ∈ ሺ0, ߙ௟ሿ, then ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൐ 0; (2) 
for ߙ ∈ ሺߙ௟, 1ሻ, then there exists a unique  ߬௟  such that ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൏ 0 if ߬ ൏ ߬௟  and 
vice versa. 
Proof:  From (12), we have: 
݀݌∗
݈݀ ൌ
߬ሺߦଷ ൅ ߦସሻ
ሺ1 െ ݈ሻଶሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤
ܣሺ1 െ ߙሻሾߙߚሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሿఈ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ൨
ଵ
ଵିఈ, 
where  
 ߦଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ሺߠ ൅ ݊ሻሾߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൐ 0,  
 ߦସ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠሼ݈ሾߠሺ1 ൅ ݈ሻ ൅ ݊ሿ െ ߙሺ2ߠ݈ ൅ ݊ሻሽ. 
Define ߙ௟ ൌ ௟ሾఏሺଵା௟ሻା௡ሿଶఏ௟ା௡ . Note that 0 ൏ ߙ௟ ൏ 1.  If ߙ ൑ ߙ௟, then ߦସ ൒ 0, implying 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௟ ൐ 0. 
If ߙ ∈ ሺߙ௟, 1ሻ, then ߦସ ൏ 0. Define ߬௟ ൌ ሺଵାఈఉሻఏሼ௟ሾఏሺଵା௟ሻା௡ሿିఈሺଶఏ௟ା௡ሻሽିሺଵିఈሻ௡ሺఏା௡ሻఈሺଵାఉሻ௡ሺఏା௡ሻሺଵିఈሻమ . Thus, 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௟ ൏ 0 if ߬ ൏ ߬௟ and vice versa. 
QED.  
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Because the lower the output elasticity of capital is, the smaller the reduction in wages caused 
by the postponement of retirement age, then ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൐ 0 if ߙ ൏ ߙ௟. If ߙ ൐ ߙ௟, then the postponement of 
retirement age will cause a larger reduction in wages and the results will depend on ߬. Note that ߙ௟ 
depends on ݊, ݈, and ߠ with డఈ೗డ௡ ൏ 0, 
డఈ೗
డ௟ ൐ 0, and 
డఈ೗
డఏ ൐ 0. Since developed countries tend to have a 
higher ߙ௟ due to lower fertility, higher retirement age and higher productivity of old workers , it is 
very likely that postponing the retirement age would increase ݌∗ in developed countries. Our results 
are different from Miyazaki (2014) who finds that ݌∗  will increase in ݈  if ݈  is sufficiently high, 
regardless of the value of ߙ. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies how the fertility rate and official pension age affect PAYG pensions based on an 
overlapping generations model. Although most people believe that increasing fertility or delaying 
retirement age would raise pensions, this paper’s findings suggest that governments should also 
take the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate into consideration when looking into the 
problem of a pension crisis. 
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